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UNITED S TA TES v. OAKLAND CANNABIS
BUYERS' COOPERATIVE: WHATEVER
HAPPENED TO FEDERALISM?
United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative, 532 U.S.
483 (2001).
I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative' the
Supreme Court held that there is no medical exception to the Con-
trolled Substances Act's ("CSA")2 prohibitions on manufacturing and
distributing marijuana. Justice Thomas reasoned that because Con-
gress unambiguously designated marijuana as a Schedule I substance
within the CSA, it had determined that there was no current "ac-
cepted medical use" or medical benefit of marijuana to warrant an
exception granted to other drugs under the Act.' Thus, due to what
Thomas deemed to be "apparently absolute language" of the CSA,
the Court summarily rejected the assertion of the Oakland Cannabis
Buyers' Cooperative (the "Cooperative") that because a medical ne-
cessity defense exists under the common law, a medical necessity ex-
ception should be read into the CSA.4 Lastly, the Court held that al-
though lower federal courts do enjoy "sound discretion," this
discretion does not allow federal courts to ignore Congress's judg-
ment expressed within legislation.'
This Note argues that the Supreme Court's decision in Oakland
is inadequate because it fails to examine an issue necessary to resolve
this case: does Congress's attempt to regulate the wholly intrastate
activity of distribution of marijuana for medical purposes under the
CSA exceed Congress's enumerated commerce power? First, the
principles of federalism on which our government is based, in con-
1 532 U.S. 483, 494-95 (2001) [hereinafter Oakland].
2 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (1994 & Supp. V. 1998).
I d. at 491-92.
4 Id. at 490-91.
' Id. at 496-98.
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junction with the facts of Oakland, require this inquiry. Federalism
plays a crucial role in the strained relationship between California's
Proposition 215,6 under which the defendant cannabis cooperatives
formed, and the CSA. Furthermore, both Oakland and the broader
medical marijuana issue involve a situation in which California has
chosen to serve as a social and economic laboratory.' As Justice Ste-
vens pointed out in his concurrence, when such situations arise, it is
the duty of the Supreme Court, and all federal courts, to step in and,
whenever possible, resolve any conflicts between state and federal
law.8
Second, by failing to address federalism principles and the con-
stitutionality of the CSA, the Court's decision in Oakland is inconsis-
tent with the Rehnquist Court's recent reinvigoration of federalism
and its efforts to apply "judicially enforceable outer limits" on Con-
gress's commerce power.9 This Note argues that when one examines
the CSA under the heightened standards the Court set forth in Lopez
and Morrison, it becomes clear that the Act, as applied to the wholly
intrastate cultivation, possession, and use of medical marijuana is
highly constitutionally suspect, if not wholly unconstitutional.
II. BACKGROUND
A. PROPOSITION 215
In November 1996, Proposition 215, the "Medical Use of Mari-
juana" initiative, was passed in California by fifty-six percent of citi-
zens participating in a statewide election,"° and was codified into law
as the "Compassionate Use Act."'1  The Proposition was enacted
"[t]o ensure that seriously ill Californians have the right to obtain and
use marijuana for medical purposes."'" Its broad language legalizes
marijuana possession and cultivation by seriously ill patients and
their caregivers for use by the patient if the patient's physician rec-
6 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362 (West 2002).
1 Oakland, 532 U.S. at 502.
8 id.
9 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995) (federal criminal penalty for
possession of a firearm in a school zone); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)
(federal civil remedy for gender-violence).
10 United States v. Cannabis Cultivators Club, 5 F. Supp. 2d. 1086, 1091 (N.D. Cal.
1998) [hereinafter Cannabis],
11 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.
2 See id. § 11362.5(b)(1)(A).
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ommends such treatment.'3 Such patients and their primary caregiv-
ers are exempt under Proposition 215 from prosecution for posses-
sion of marijuana under California's Health and Safety Code section
11357 and for cultivation of marijuana under section 11358.14
Eight other states have followed California's lead in passing
medical marijuana initiatives declaring that persons with a medical
need to smoke marijuana will not be prosecuted for possessing or
manufacturing the substance.1 5 On June 14, 2000, Hawaii's Gover-
nor Ben Cayetano (D) signed into law a bill that protects seriously ill
patients who use marijuana medically from local and state prosecu-
tion. 6 However, such sentiment and action certainly has not yet
transferred to the federal level. The Clinton Administration immedi-
ately responded to the California and Arizona initiatives with an un-
equivocal official announcement that federal drug statutes were the
controlling legal authority in the United States.'" Several federal law
enforcement agencies also made public statements warning Califor-
nia citizens that possession and cultivation of marijuana was a federal
crime, regardless if those actions were now legal under California
law.' 8 As recently as September 1998, the House of Representatives
declared its opposition to the legalization of marijuana for medical
use in a "sense of Congress" resolution entitled "Not Legalizing
Marijuana for Medical Use" by a 310-93 margin. 9
"3 See id. §§ I 1362.5(c)-(d). For a discussion about the broad language used by Proposi-
tion 215's drafters and 215's drafting flaws, see Michael Vitiello, Proposition 215: De Facto
Legalization of Pot and the Shortcomings of Direct Democracy, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
707 (1998).
14 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11357, 11358; Cannabis, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 1091.
15 Arizona voters also approved medical marijuana laws in 1996. See ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-3412.01 (2001). Voters in Alaska, Oregon and Washington approved similar
laws in 1998, followed by voters in Maine in 1999, and Hawaii, Colorado and Nevada in
2000. While voters in the District of Columbia passed an initiative with sixty-nine perccnt
in 1998, Congress overrode the law. See Nat'l Org. to Reform Marijuana Laws, Medical
Frequently Asked Questions, at http://www.norml.org/index.cfm?Group_lD=33 87 (last
modified Mar. 28, 2002).
16 National Organization to Reform Marijuana Laws, Medical Frequently Asked Ques-
tions, at http://www.norml.org/index.cfm?Group_ID=4533&wtm-view=medical (last ac-
cessed Sept. 16, 2002).
17 See Administration Response to Arizona Proposition 200 and California Proposition
215, 62 Fed. Reg. 6164 (Feb. 11, 1997).
18 See William Claiborne, Federal Warning on Medical Marijuana Leaves Physicians
Feeling Intimidated, WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 1997, at A6; see also infra Part 1](B)(2) discussion
of Conant v. McCaffrey, 172 F.R.D. 681 (N.D. Cal. 1997) [hereinafter Conant 1].
19 In this piece of legislation, Congress declared that it "continues to support the existing
Federal legal process for determining the safety and efficacy of drugs and opposes efforts to
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B. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT
The controlling federal drug statute in the United States is the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970
("CSA"), which prohibits the manufacture and distribution of various
drugs."0 The Act specifically provides that "it shall be unlawful for
any person knowingly or intentionally ... to manufacture, distribute,
or dispense, a controlled substance.""1 The CSA assigns controlled
substances to one of five "Schedules" depending on the substance's
potential for abuse, the extent to which use may lead to psychological
or physical dependence, and whether a substance has a currently ac-
cepted medical use in the United States.2 Substances which have a
"high potential for abuse," "no currently accepted medical use in
treatment," and "a lack of accepted safety for use of the drug ... un-
der medical supervision" are designated "Schedule I.23 Schedule I
substances are strictly regulated, and the Act provides only one ex-
plicit exception in which use of Schedule I substances is permitted:
government-approved research projects. 4 Physicians, therefore, can-
not legally dispense Schedule I substances to any patient; however,
physicians may lawfully distribute substances designated in Sched-
ules II through V. 5
Congress placed marijuana, along with LSD and heroine, in
Schedule I upon passage of the Act and it has remained in Schedule I
to the present day. 6 Organizations such as the National Organization
for the Reform of Marijuana Laws ("NORML") and the Alliance for
Cannabis Therapeutics ("ACT") have been trying to reschedule mari-
juana from Schedule I to Schedule II for many years.2 7 However,
circumvent this process by legalizing marijuana, and other Schedule I drugs, for medicinal
use without valid scientific evidence and the approval of the Food and Drug Administra-
tion." H.R.J. Res. 117, 105th Cong., 144 CONG. REC. H7719 (1998). Record of votes on the
resolution appear at 144 CONG. REC. 1-17783 (1998). See also Judy Holland, House Votes to
Oppose Medical Maryuana Use, S.F. EXAMINER, Sept. 16, 1998, at AI0.
20 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (1994 & Supp. V 1998).
21 Id. § 841 (a)(1); § 844(a) makes possession unlawful.
22 21 U.S.C. § 812(b).
23 Id. § 812(b)(1).
24 Id. § 823(o.
2 See 21 U.S.C. § 823(f). Note an exception: doctors may dispense Schedule I sub-
stances to any patient within a strictly controlled research project that has been registered by
the DEA and approved by the FDA.
26 21 U.S.C § 812(c) (listed under Schedule 1(c)(10)).
27 See, e.g., Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics v. DEA, 15 F.3d 1131 (D.C. Cir. 1994);
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their efforts have repeatedly failed at both the legislative and admin-
istrative levels.28 Supporters of rescheduling argue that failure to re-
schedule marijuana is absurd when substances such as morphine and
cocaine are classified as Schedule II substances, given the medical
knowledge of greater risks associated with the latter substances.
29
The federal government has unanimously and adamantly op-
posed rescheduling, arguing that marijuana has no proven medical
value,3" or, alternatively, that the harms outweigh any potential bene-
fit that may result from rescheduling." Congress has consistently re-
jected legislation to remove marijuana from Schedule I to Schedule
J1.32 The Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA") also has the au-
thority from the Attorney General to reschedule marijuana,33 but it
too has refused to do so. In 1986, the DEA agreed to conduct public
hearings on the possible rescheduling of marijuana.34 After two years
of hearings, an administrative law judge recommended the removal
of marijuana from Schedule I to Schedule II due to its "currently ac-
cepted medical use."35 However, the Administrator of the DEA re-
fused to apply the recommendation, and instead applied an eight-
Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics v. DEA, 930 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Nat'l Org. for
the Reform of Marijuana Laws v. DEA, 559 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Nat'l Org. for the
Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Ingersoll, 497 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
28 See generally Gregg A. Bilz, The Medical Use of Marijuana." The Politics ofMedicine,
13 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 117, 124-30 (1992) (describing the several failed legal at-
tempts to reschedule marijuana in the 1980s).
29 See, e.g., Jerome P. Kassirer, M.D., Editorial, Federal Foolishness and Mariuana,
336 NEW ENG. J. MED. 366, 366 (1997) (concluding "[a] federal policy that prohibits physi-
cians from alleviating the suffering by prescribing marijuana is seriously misguided, heavy-
handed, and inhumane").
30 See, e.g., Drug Enforcement Admin., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Say It Straight: The Medi-
cal Myths of Mariuana, at http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/sayit/myths.htm (last visited
Sept. 13, 2002).
31 See Medical Marijuana Referenda Movement in America: Hearing Before the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Crime, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Gen. Barry
R. McCaffrey, Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy, submitted for the Record),
available at 1997 WL 14151535.
32 See, e.g., H.R. 912, 106th Cong. (1999) and H.R. 1782, 105th Cong. (1997) (both bills
proposed by Barney Frank, D-MA, entitled "The Medical Use of Marijuana Act"); see also
Holland, supra note 19.
33 See http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/agency/csa.htm (last visited on Nov. 3, 2001).
34 See LESTER GRINSPOON, M.D. & JAMES B. BAKALAR, MARIJUANA: THE FORBIDDEN
MEDICINE 14-15 (1993).
35 Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics v. DEA, 930 F.2d 936, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
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factor test to reschedule marijuana. 6
In the mid-1970s, the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA")
did establish an Individual Use Investigational New Drug ("IND")
program, which gave a small number of patients access to marijuana
on a limited and experimental basis.3 7 However, in 1989, due to the
drastic rise in AIDS, the FDA was bombarded with applications for
the IND program.3" This led to the suspension and discontinuation of
the program in 1991 and 1992, respectively, because, as the chief of
the Public Health Service explained, the program undercut the federal
government's opposition to the use of illegal drugs.39 Only eight pa-
tients from the program continue to receive marijuana presently."
1. California Courts and Proposition 215
The California Court of Appeals for the First District has ad-
dressed Proposition 215 in two separate, disagreeing opinions.41
First, in People v. Trippet42 the Court held that Proposition 215 does
not exempt a seriously ill patient and his primary caregiver from
California's Health and Safety Code section 11360, which prohibits
the transportation of marijuana.43 However, the court held that
Proposition 215 might provide a defense for a defendant charged with
illegally transporting marijuana so long as "the quantity transported
and the method, timing and distance of the transportation are rea-
sonably related to the patient's current medical needs."44
36 Id. (the factors were (1) scientific knowledge of the drug's chemistry, (2) its toxicol-
ogy in animals, (3) established effectiveness treating humans in clinical trials, (4) availability
of the substance and the facts about its effects, (5) documentation of uses in generally ac-
cepted medical reference materials, (6) specific indications for use, (7) acceptance by the
community of medical professionals, and (8) acceptance and use by a substantial body of
U.S. medical practitioners).
37 See generally GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 34, at 17-18. See also Lauryn P.
Gouldin, Controlled Substances Law: Cannabis, Compassionate Use and the Commerce
Clause: Why Developments in California May Limit the Constitutional Reach of the Federal
Drug Laws, 1999 ANN. SURV. Am. L. 471, 479 (1999).
38 GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 34, at 17-18; see also Gouldin, supra note 37, at
479.
39 GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 34, at 21-22; see also Gouldin, supra note 37, at
479.
40 See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, For a Very Few Patients, U.S. Provides Free Mariuana,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1999, at A10.
41 Cannabis, 5 F. Supp. 2d. 1086, 1091 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
42 56 Cal. App. 4th 1532 (1st Dist. 1997).
43 Id.
41 Id. at 1550-51.
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Three months later, a different division of this court handed
down another decision addressing Proposition 215 in People ex rel.
Lungren v. Peron.45 In Peron, the court held that the defendants,
Dennis Peron and the San Francisco Cannabis Cultivators Club, were
not primary caregivers within the meaning of Proposition 215.46 The
court further held that Proposition 215 does exempt seriously ill pa-
tients and their caregivers from California Health and Safety Code
sections 11357 and 11358, which prohibit possession and cultivation
of marijuana.4 7 However, the court disagreed with Trippet in further
holding that Proposition 215 does not, under any circumstances, ex-
empt such patients from sections 11359 and 11360, which prohibit
the sale or giving away of marijuana. The Supreme Court of Califor-
nia denied review of the Peron decision on February 25, 1998.48
2. Federal Case Law and Proposition 215
The federal government's opposition to Proposition 215 was first
directed towards physicians in California who recommended medici-
nal use of marijuana pursuant to state law.4 9 Specifically, the De-
partment of Justice, the Department of Health and Human Services,
the Drug Enforcement Agency, and General Barry McCaffrey, the
Director of the National Drug Control Policy, threatened physicians
with criminal prosecution, disqualification from Medicare and Medi-
caid programs, and revocation of DEA registration to prescribe con-
trolled substances." A group of California physicians and their pa-
tients responded to the government with a class action lawsuit that
directly challenged the constitutionality of the Clinton Administra-
tion's threat to prosecute California physicians who recommended
the medical use of marijuana for their seriously ill patients. 1 Specifi-
cally, they asserted that the threat of prosecution violated their First
45 59 Cal. App. 4th 1383 (1st Dist. 1997).
46 Id. at 1392-93. Note that Mr. Peron and the San Francisco Club appeared as defen-
dants in Oakland.
47 Peron, 59 Cal. App. 4th. at 1392.
48 Id. at 1402.
49 See Conant I, 172'F.R.D. 681, 686-87 (N.D. Cal. 1997). See also Administration Re-
sponse to Arizona Proposition 200 and California Proposition 215, 62 Fed. Reg. 6164 (Feb.
11, 1997) (notice signed by Barry McCaffrey, Director of National Drug Control Policy).
50 See Administration Response, supra note 49.
51 Conant 1, 172 F.R.D. at 686. For a thorough discussion of Conant I, see J. Wells
Dixon, Note, Conant v. McCaffrey: Physicians, Marijuana, and the First Amendment, 70 U.
CoLO. L. REV. 975 (1999).
2002]
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Amendment free speech rights to discuss marijuana. 2 The federal
district court granted a preliminary injunction on the ground that the
federal government threats may infringe upon the physicians' First
Amendment rights. 3
However, the Court greatly limited its opinion by also holding
that conversations between the physicians and patients were protected
only to the extent that the physician did not aid and abet or conspire
to violate the federal prohibition against marijuana. 4 On September
7, 2000, however, the district court permanently enjoined the federal
government from threatening to revoke DEA prescription licenses
from physicians who recommend marijuana to patients, holding that
in light of the First Amendment the DEA had exceeded its author-
ity.55 The court held that while the federal government had a legiti-
mate concern in enforcing marijuana prohibition, this concern
"pale[d] in comparison to free speech concerns."56
III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
A. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Since the passage of Proposition 215, several individuals have
created non-profit "medical cannabis dispensaries" or "cooperatives"
to provide marijuana for seriously ill patients upon a physician's rec-
ommendation. 7 To date, approximately twenty-five cannabis coop-
eratives have been established in California.58 The organizers claim
that prior to the creation of these dispensaries, qualified patients were
forced to purchase marijuana, if they could at all, on the black mar-
ket, paying excessive prices for questionable quality marijuana. 9
In these cooperatives, a physician serves as medical director, and
registered nurses staff the organization during business hours.6 To
52 Conant 1, 172 F.R.D. at 686.
" Id. at 701.
54 id.
55 See Conant v. McCaffrey, No. C 97-00139 WHA, 2000 WL 1281174 (N.D. Cal. Sept.
7, 2000).
16 Id. at 15.
57 United States v. Cannabis Cultivators Club, 5 F. Supp. 2d. 1086, 1092 (N.D. Cal.
1998).
58 Jean Merl, Mariuana Distribution Ban Alarms Patients, L.A. TiMES, Aug. 31, 2000, at
Cl.
59 Cannabis, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 1091.
60 United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative, 532 U.S. 483, 494-95
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become a member of a Cooperative, patients are required to provide a
written statement from a treating physician agreeing to marijuana
therapy, and the patient then must go through a screening interview.6
If a patient is accepted, he receives an identification card that allows
him to procure marijuana from the Cooperative.62
In January of 1998, more than a year after California voters
passed Proposition 215, the United States filed six separate lawsuits
against six independent cannabis dispensaries and individuals in-
volved with the dispensaries.63 Pursuant to Local Rule 3-12, all six
cases were reassigned to the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California as related cases.64
The United States alleged that the defendants violated federal
law under the CSA whether or not the defendants' activities were le-
gal under California law. Specifically, the federal government al-
leged that the defendants' manufacture and distribution of marijuana
violated 21 U.S.C. section 841(a)(1); their use of facilities (the actual
locations) for the purpose of manufacture and distribution violated 21
U.S.C. section 856(a)(1); and the individual defendants' conspiracy
to violate the CSA violated 21 U.S.C. section 846.65 Thus, the United
States sought to preliminarily and permanently enjoin the Coopera-
tive from distributing and manufacturing marijuana under 21 U.S.C.
section 882(a), which provides federal district courts with jurisdiction
to enjoin violations of the Act.66
The Cooperative argued that the court should dismiss the federal
government's claims because 21 U.S.C. section 841(a) exceeded
Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause.67 The defendants
further argued that just as Congress did not have the authority to




63 The defendants in the related actions were: Cannabis Cultivators Club and Dennis
Peron; Marin Alliance for Medical Marijuana and Lynette Shaw; Ukiah Cannabis Buyers'
Club, Cherrie Lovett, Marvin Leherman and Mildred Leherman; Oakland Cannabis Buyers'
Cooperative and Jeffrey Jones; Flower Therapy Medical Marijuana Club, John Hudson,
Mary Palmer and Barbara Sweeney; and Santa Cruz Cannabis Buyers Club. Cannabis, 5 F.
Supp. 2d at 1092 n.1.
64 Id. at 1093.
65 id.
66 id.
67 Id. at 1094.
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Court held in Lopez,68 Congress also did not have the authority to
regulate their purely intrastate conduct because the marijuana was
both manufactured and distributed solely within California.69 The
court placed the defendants' arguments into three categories: (1) de-
fendants have not violated federal law; (2) defendants have valid de-
fenses to their violation of the law; and (3) equitable principles pre-
clude injunctive relief"
B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1. United States v. Cannabis Cultivators Club (1998)("Cannabis ")
In Cannabis, the district court held that the Government estab-
lished a probability that it would likely succeed on the merits of its
claim that the defendants are in violation of federal law.71 Thus, it
granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting the defendants from
manufacturing or distributing marijuana, or from possessing mari-
juana with the intent to manufacture and distribute it.72
First, the court held that it has jurisdiction to hear the case be-
cause the CSA does not exceed Congress's power under the Com-
merce Clause.73 The court asserted that when Congress declares that
an entire class of activities affects commerce, courts have no power
to "'excise, as trivial individual instances' of the class.74 The court
pointed to Congress's detailed findings that intrastate cultivation, dis-
tribution and possession of controlled substances have "a substantial
and direct effect upon interstate commerce."75 The court also stressed
that since Lopez was decided, the Ninth Circuit has held that Con-
gress's enactment of the CSA is permissible under the Commerce
Clause.76 The court rejected the defendants' argument that distribu-
tion of marijuana to seriously ill patients is not within the class of ac-
tivities that Congress sought to regulate with the CSA, arguing that
even if such activity falls into a different class, that class also sub-
68 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
69 United States v. Cannabis Cultivators Club, 5 F. Supp. 2d. 1086, 1094 (N.D. Cal.
1998).
70 id.
7, Id. at 1103.
71 Id. at 1106.
"3 Id. at 1098.
74 Id. at 1097 (citing Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971)).
75 Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 801(3)-(6)).
76 Id. at 1097.
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stantially affects interstate commerce.77 The court decided that there
is nothing about the nature of medical marijuana that limits it to intra-
state cultivation or distribution.7" The court concluded that distribu-
tion, even "if done for the humanitarian purpose of service the legiti-
mate health care needs of seriously ill patients," can affect interstate
commerce.
79
Moving on to the merits of the case, the court then held that the
Government established it would likely succeed in proving that the
defendants' conduct violated federal law. First, the court asserted
that it is immaterial whether the defendants' conduct falls within
Proposition 215. It concluded that a state law which purports to le-
galize the distribution of marijuana for any purpose, "even a laudable
one," nonetheless directly conflicts with federal law, specifically 21
U.S.C. section 841(a), which does not exempt the distribution of
marijuana to seriously ill persons for their personal medical use. 81
Lastly, the court held that the joint users defense, the ultimate
user defense, and, most importantly, the medical necessity defense
would not preclude the granting of injunctive relief sought here.82
The court explained that for the medical necessity defense to succeed,
the defendants would have the difficult task of proving that each and
every patient it provides marijuana to is in danger of imminent harm,
the marijuana will alleviate that harm, and that each patient had no
other alternatives.
8 3
The district court concluded by asserting that it was not declaring
Proposition 215 to be unconstitutional, and it was not enjoining pos-
session of marijuana by seriously ill patients for medical use upon a
physician's recommendation.84 The court also made clear that it was
not foreclosing the possibility of a medical necessity or constitution-
ality defense in any proceeding in which it is alleged that a defendant
has violated the injunction the court issued in its opinion."
The Cooperative did not appeal the injunction, but violated it by
I' d. at 1098.
78 Id.
79 Id.
'0 Id. at 1100.
8' Id.
82 id.
83 Id. at 1102.




continuing to distribute marijuana to several persons.86 The Govern-
ment initiated contempt proceedings, in which the Cooperative de-
fended that any distributions were medically necessary.87 The district
court rejected this defense, found the Cooperative in contempt, and,
at the Government's request, modified the injunction to empower a
United States Marshall to seize the Cooperative's premises.8 A few
days later, the district court summarily rejected a motion made by the
Cooperative to modify the injunction to permit medically necessary
distributions.89
2. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative
(1999)("OCBC")
In response to the district court's decision, the Cooperative and
its executive, Jeffrey Jones, (collectively, "the Cooperative") sought
an interlocutory appeal with the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit.9" The appellants did not appeal the district court's order enjoin-
ing the distribution of marijuana, but sought to appeal three subse-
quent district court orders: (1) the order denying the Cooperative's
motion to dismiss, (2) the order subsequently purged and vacated that
found the Cooperative in contempt of the injunction, and (3) the order
denying the Cooperative's motion to modify the injunction to permit
cannabis distribution to persons who have a doctor's certificate that
marijuana is a medical necessity.91
Because the Ninth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction over the
first two district court orders, it only ruled on the third, the district
court's refusal to modify the injunction to include a medical necessity
exception.9 2 The court reversed the district court's denial of the mo-
tion to modify the injunction, and remanded for the district court to
include in the injunction the criteria for the medical necessity exemp-
86 Oakland, 532 U.S. 483, 494-95 (2001).
87 id.
88 Id.
9 Id. at 488.
90 United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative, 190 F.3d 1109, 1111 (9th
Cir. 1999) [hereinafter OCBC].
91 Id.
92 The Court held that it lacked jurisdiction over the denial of the motion to dismiss be-
cause denial of the motion to dismiss is not one of the interlocutory orders that can be ap-
pealed under 28 U.S.C. § 1292, and it is not a final judgment under § 1291. It further held
that it lacked jurisdiction over the contempt order appeal because the order was purged, ren-
dering the issue moot. OCBC, 190 F.3d at 1111-12.
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tion93 established in the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v.
Aguilar.94
First, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court had the discre-
tion to modify the injunction.95 The court asserted that the district
court was mistaken in its belief that it did not have the power to issue
an injunction more limited in scope than the CSA.96 The court held
that district courts have broad equitable discretion in deciding injunc-
tions against violations of federal statutes unless Congress has bal-
anced the equities and has explicitly mandated an injunction within
the statute.97 The court concluded that nothing in the CSA mandates
a limitation on district courts' equitable discretion. 98 Thus, the court
asserted that the district court was not being asked to ignore federal
law as it claimed it was, but was instead being asked to simply take
into account the "legally cognizable defense" of medical necessity
that most likely would pertain to this particular case.99 The court rea-
soned that had the federal government chosen to enforce the CSA not
through an injunction but in the usual way, by arresting and prosecut-
ing the defendants, the defendants would have been able to raise the
medical necessity defense in the course of litigation.'
Second, the court held that the district court abused its discretion
in deciding this issue without considering the public interest on the
record."0 ' The court stated that the materials the Cooperative submit-
ted in support of its motion to modify the injunction clearly showed a
strong public interest in the availability of cannabis to treat debilitat-
ing and life threatening conditions suffered by a large population of
California's citizens.'0 2 Through this evidence, the court held that the
Cooperative showed that there is a class of people who could fulfill
the requirements of the medical necessity exception. 0 3 By contrast,
9' Id. at 1115.
9' 883 F.2d 662, 692 (9th Cir. 1989).
" OCBC, 190 F.3d at 1115.
96 id.
97 Id. at 1114 (citing Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir.
1988)).




102 The Court referred specifically to the fact that the City of Oakland had declared a
public health emergency in response to-the district court's refusal to grant the modification




the court asserted that the Government did not identify any interest it
may have in blocking the distribution of marijuana to those with
medical needs, relying instead only on its general interest in the en-
forcement of federal statutes.
The Government appealed the district court's order amending the
preliminary injunction. The U.S. Supreme Court granted the Gov-
ernment's request to stay the order pending appeal,"0 4 and granted
certiorari to review the decision of the Ninth Circuit that medical ne-
cessity is a legally cognizable defense to violations of the CSA.'0°
IV. SUMMARY OF THE OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
The majority opinion stated that the Court granted certiorari be-
cause the Ninth Circuit's decision "raise[d] significant questions as to
the ability of the United States to enforce the Nation's drug laws."10 6
The Supreme Court held that there is no medical necessity exception
to the CSA's prohibitions on manufacturing and distributing mari-
juana." 7 Justice Thomas reasoned that even assuming the necessity
was a recognized defense to a criminal violation, a medical necessity
exception for marijuana was at odds with the unambiguous terms of
the CSA.' °8
Justice Thomas began his inquiry by looking to the actual lan-
guage of the CSA. He pointed out first that the Act clearly desig-
nated marijuana as a Schedule I substance, which provided for only
one express exception to the prohibitions on manufacturing and dis-
tributing of marijuana: government-approved research projects.0 9
Thomas continued that under any conception of legal necessity, the
defense cannot succeed when the legislature has made a "determina-
tion of values." ' 0 In this case, he stated that the CSA's structure and
its placement of marijuana in Schedule I reflected Congress's un-
equivocal determination that marijuana has "no currently accepted
medical use" and that marijuana has no medical benefits worthy of an
104 United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative, 530 U.S. 1298 (2000).
105 United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative, 531 U.S. 1010 (2000).
106 Oakland, 532 U.S. 483, 489 (2001) (Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and
O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy, J.J.).
'07 Id. at 493-95.
08 Id. at 490-94.
I d. at 490 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 823(o).
0 Id. at 491.
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exception granted to other drugs under the Act. 1"
Due to what Thomas deemed "apparently absolute language" of
the CSA, he summarily rejected the Cooperative's contention that be-
cause there is a necessity defense at common law, a medical necessity
exception can and should be read into the CSA." 2 Justice Thomas
continued by calling the general defense of necessity into question,
stating that it is controversial, especially because under our constitu-
tional system, federal crimes are defined by statute and not the com-
mon law." 3 However, he held that further inquiry into the necessity
defense was not necessary in the instant case because the language of
the CSA leaves "no doubt" that the medical necessity defense is un-
available.'
The second half of the decision is devoted to the Supreme
Court's rejection of the Cooperative's argument that federal courts
acting as courts of equity have discretion to modify an injunction
based upon a weighing of public interest factors." 5 Thomas held that
this argument is not a basis for affirming the Ninth Circuit, even
though the district court in this case did have discretion. He argued
that, while district courts do enjoy "sound discretion,""' 6 the mere fact
that a court has discretion does not mean that it can ignore Congress's
judgment expressed within the legislation." 7 Thomas asserted, how-
ever, that district courts have the discretion to choose between an in-
junction and other enforcement mechanisms, not whether enforce-
ment is preferable to no enforcement." 8
Lastly, Justice Thomas held that the Ninth Circuit erred by con-
sidering the following evidence as relevant to its determination: that
some people have "serious medical conditions for whom the use of
cannabis is necessary in order to treat or alleviate those conditions,"
that these patients "will suffer serious harm if they are denied canna-
bis," and that there is "no legal alternative to cannabis for the effec-
tive treatment of their medical conditions.""' 9 Thomas asserted that
.. Id. at 491-92.
2 d. at 490-91.
I'3 d. at 490.
''4 Id. at 491.
"' Id. at 495.
116 Id. (quoting Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1944)).
''7 Id. at 496-97 (citing Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed'n No. 40, Ry. Employees Dep't,
300 U.S. 515, 551 (1937)).
118 Id.
119 Id. at 498 (quoting OCBC, 190 F.3d at 1115).
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because the CSA covers those people who have what could be termed
a medical necessity for marijuana, the Act precluded consideration of
this evidence. 2'
B. JUSTICE STEVENS' CONCURRENCE
121
Justice Stevens agreed with the majority's reversal of the Ninth
Circuit's determination that the Cooperative had a "legally cogniza-
ble" medical necessity defense.'22 However, his main concern with
Justice Thomas's majority opinion was the broad dicta, and the "un-
warranted and unfortunate excursions" that Thomas made in his opin-
ion, which prevented Stevens from joining the majority.'23
Justice Stevens first clarified the majority's "narrow" and "lim-
ited" holding: "We hold that medical necessity is not a defense to
manufacturing and distributing marijuana."' 24 He argued that the ma-
jority's opinion reached far beyond the facts of this case by suggest-
ing that the medical necessity defense is unavailable for anyone under
the CSA.'25 The only issue presented in this case, Stevens asserted, is
whether the medical necessity defense is available to distributors of
marijuana.2 6 Stevens argued that the majority "gratuitously casts
doubt" on whether necessity could ever be a defense to any federal
statute that does not explicitly provide for it.'2' Stevens criticized the
majority's assertion that this is an "open question," and argued that
Supreme Court precedent has undoubtedly established that necessity
is a viable common law defense, even in cases involving federal
criminal statutes that do not provide for it.'2 8
Justice Stevens stressed the "importance of showing respect for
the sovereign States" and discussed the implications of the majority's
overly broad language for federalism.'29 He argued that this is a case
120 Id.
121 Justice Ginsburg joined in Justice Stevens' concurrence. Justice Breyer took no part
in the consideration or the decision of this case.
122 Id. at 500 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting OCBC, 190 F.3d 1109, 1114 (9th Cir.
1999)).
123 Id. at 499-500 (Stevens, J., concurring).
124 Id. at 499-500 (Stevens, J., concurring).
25 Id. at 500-501 (Stevens, J., concurring).
126 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
127 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
128 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 415
(1980)).
129 Id. at 501-502 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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in which the citizens of a State had chosen to serve as a laboratory for
the law, and that in such situations federal courts have a duty to re-
spect and, whenever possible, to avoid conflicts between state and
federal law.13 Stevens asserted that Oakland is such a case because
the voters of California had decided that seriously ill patients and
their primary caregivers should be exempt from prosecution under
state law."' Thus, Stevens argued, the Court should not use this de-
cision to deprive all such patients of the benefit of a necessity defense
to federal prosecution.'3
V. LEGAL ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court's decision in Oakland is incomplete in that it
ignores the critical underlying issue that is necessary to resolve this
case: whether the CSA's regulation of wholly intrastate cultivation,
possession, and use of medical marijuana, sanctioned by California
law, exceeds Congress's enumerated power under the Commerce
Clause. The "first principles" of federalism command the Court to
intervene in cases such as Oakland in which tension exists between
state and federal law and in which Congress seeks to regulate wholly
intrastate activities under its Commerce Clause power. 133 Further-
more, because the Court in Oakland failed to address this crucial is-
sue, the decision is inconsistent with the Rehnquist Court's reinvigo-
rated loyalty to federalism and to reining in Congress's commerce
power. Lastly, had the Court examined the CSA under the height-
ened scrutiny of Lopez and Morrison, its decision should have been
radically different because a heightened review of the CSA under Lo-
pez and Morrison reveals that the Act's regulation of wholly intra-
state cultivation, possession and use of state sanctioned medical mari-
juana exceeds Congress's commerce power.
A. THE OAKLAND DECISION IS INCOMPLETE IN ITS FAILURE TO
ADDRESS THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCES ACT
Justice Thomas's opinion in Oakland ignores a crucial issue that
is necessary to resolve this case: does Congress's attempt to regulate
130 id.
131 Id. at 502 (Stevens, J., concurring).
132 Id.




the wholly intrastate activity of distribution of marijuana for medical
purposes under the CSA exceed the power afforded to Congress by
the Commerce Clause? In Oakland, the Court held that the language
and the structure of the CSA abrogate the discretion of federal courts
to balance potential harms in issuing injunctions and eliminate the
medical necessity defense. 34 The next logical and necessary question
the Court should have addressed is whether such a broad statute,
which, according to the majority, lies beyond the reach of both the
federal courts and the states, exceeds Congress's enumerated com-
merce power. Had the Court addressed this issue, it should have
found that the CSA, as it is applied to conduct related to the medical
use of marijuana, is, at the very least, highly constitutionally suspect.
1. Federalism Principles Require an Inquiry into the Constitutionality of
the CSA
In order to avoid an all-powerful central government and to en-
sure state sovereignty, the Constitution declares the federal govern-
ment to be one of enumerated powers. 35 Furthermore, the Tenth
Amendment proclaims that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are re-
served to the States respectively, or to the people."'36  One of the
enumerated powers granted to Congress by the Constitution is the
power to "regulate Commerce with Foreign Nations, and among the
several states, and with the Indian Tribes," '37 known generally as the
commerce power. Police powers, including the protection of public
health, 3' safety, and morals of citizens, are left to the states, how-
ever."'39 Nevertheless, despite its lack of a "police power," Congress
134 Oakland, 532 U.S. at 493-98.
"' U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. See also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181
(1992) ("[T]he Constitution divides authority between federal and state governments for the
protection of individuals"); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) ("[A] healthy
balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyr-
anny and abuse from either front"); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803) ("The pow-
ers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken or
forgotten, the Constitution is written").
136 U.S. CONST. amend. X. See United States v. Printz, 521 U.S. 898, 919 (1997).
137 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
138 See Fernando R. Laguarda, Note, Federalism Myth: States as Laboratories of Health
Care Reform, 82 GEO. L.J. 159, 160 (1993) (asserting that states are "major regulators, pay-
ers, and providers of health care"). See also General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278,
306 (1997) (reaffirming the principal interest of the states in regulating health matters).
139 See RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: TIlE FOUNDER'S DESIGN 140 (1987). See also Lo-
pez, 514 U.S. at 566; Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
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has passed federal criminal laws, relying on its power under the
Commerce Clause to do so, 4 ' including the CSA.
Justice Thomas skirts the federalism issue in the Oakland deci-
sion by merely stating that the Court is not deciding any constitu-
tional issues in this opinion. 4' However, as pointed out by Justice
Stevens in his concurrence, federalism clearly plays a crucial role in
the strained relationship between California's Proposition 215 (and
similar laws in eight other states) and the CSA.'42 First, medical
marijuana falls into two categories traditionally left to the state:
health care and criminal law enforcement. 43 In enacting the CSA,
Congress claimed that it intended to allow the states to freely exercise
their independent authority over public health.' Second, the medi-
cal marijuana issue in this case involves a situation in which a state
has chosen to "serve as a laboratory" in the trial of a "novel social
and economic experiment. ''14 Thus, because of these two considera-
tions, the paramount principles of federalism impose a duty on the
federal courts, including the Supreme Court, to settle and minimize
the conflict between federal and state law at issue in Oakland.1
46
2. The Oakland Decision Is Inconsistent With The Rehnquist Court's Recent
Reinvigoration of Federalism
The Rehnquist Court has established a newfound willingness to
140 See Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief: The Federalization of American Crimi-
nal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1142-45 (1995).
141 Justice Thomas's sole explicit reference to federalism concerns is buried in a foot-
note, in which he asserts that, while the majority shares Justice Stevens' concern for the sov-
ereignty of the states, the Court is not at liberty to rewrite the federal criminal code, and is
also not passing on any constitutional question. See Oakland, 532 U.S. at 495 n.7.
142 See id. at 502 (Stevens, J., concurring).
143 See Laguarda, supra note 138, at 160 (health care primarily left to states); Brickey,
supra note 140, at 1138 (criminal law traditionally left to states).
144 See 21 U.S.C. § 903 ("No provision of this subchapter shall be construed as indicating
an intention on the part of Congress to occupy the field ... unless there is a positive conflict
between that provision of this subchapter and that state law so that the two cannot consis-
tently stand together.").
145 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
("[A] single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments ...."), quoted in Oakland, 532 U.S. at 502 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
146 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 578 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
("[T]he federal balance is too essential a part of our constitutional structure and plays too
vital a role in securing freedom for [the federal judiciary] to admit inability to intervene
when one or the other level of Government has tipped the scales too far."). See also Oak-
land, 532 U.S. at 502 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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reinvigorate federalism, and, significantly, to use federalism to limit
Congress's authority.'47 In the seminal Lopez decision, the Supreme
Court invalidated a federal criminal statute for the first time in nearly
sixty years for exceeding Congress's authority under the Commerce
Clause.'48 The Court also indicated that it would continue to subject
regulations passed by Congress's authority under the Commerce
Clause to a heightened, independent review.'49 Morrison, involved a
more recent Commerce Clause challenge in which the Court struck
down another federal statute as unconstitutional, signaling that Lopez
was not an anomaly, but is the standard by which the Rehnquist
Court will evaluate Congress's Commerce Clause authority in the fu-
ture. " ' Thus, based on the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence
since 1995, Oakland cannot be properly settled unless the constitu-
tionality of the CSA is analyzed thoroughly.
(1) United States v. Lopez: Supreme Court Creates the Standards By Which
Congressional Acts under the Commerce Clause, Including the CSA,
Are To Be Evaluated
The Supreme Court's decision in Lopez was a revolutionary shift
from the New Deal Court's interpretation of Congress's power under
the Commerce Clause.' 5' In Lopez, a twelfth grader was indicted by a
federal grand jury under the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990
("GFSZA") for bringing a concealed .38 caliber handgun and bullets
into his San Antonio high school." 2 The GFSZA, passed to deter
gun-related violence in schools, made it a federal crime "for any in-
dividual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual
147 See generally United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Lopez, 514 U.S. at
549. This willingness has also manifested itself in Tenth and Eleventh Amendment Supreme
Court decisions. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44 (1996).
148 514 U.S. at 568. For a general discussion of the merits of federalism after the Lopez
decision, see Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers": In
Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REv. 752 (1995).
149 See id. at 562 (describing the Court's "independent evaluation of constitutionality un-
der the Commerce Clause").
150 See Alistair E. Newbern, Good Cop, Bad Cop: Federal Prosecution of State-
Legalized Medical Marijuana Use After United States v. Lopez, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1575,
1608-12 (2000) (characterizing Morrison as showing that Lopez is not merely a "hiccup" in
American constitutional law).
151 See Calabresi, supra note 148, at 752 (characterizing decision as "revolutionary").
152 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
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knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone."'' 53
Lopez challenged his indictment by arguing that Congress lacked
the power under the Commerce Clause to enact the statute under
which he was charged, the GFSZA. 5 4 The United States Supreme
Court, by a narrow five-to-four decision, affirmed the Fifth Circuit's
holding that the GFSZA was unconstitutional because Congress ex-
ceeded its commerce authority by enacting it."'5 The Court laid out
three categories of activity that Congress can regulate under its com-
merce power: (1) the channels of interstate commerce, (2) the instru-
mentalities of commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce,
and (3) those activities that substantially affect interstate com-
merce.
156
Because the GSFZA, like the CSA, did not seek to regulate a
channel or instrumentality of interstate commerce, and because it
sought to regulate wholly intrastate gun possession, it might only
have fallen into the third category of activities.57 The Court held that
the proper test to determine whether Congress can regulate wholly in-
trastate activities is whether such activities have a "substantial effect"
on interstate commerce.' 8 The GFSZA, according to Chief Justice
Rehnquist, did not have a substantial effect on interstate commerce
because the Act "neither regulates a commercial activity nor contains
a requirement that the possession be connected in any way to inter-
state commerce. ' 159
The majority distinguished this case from precedent by stating
that unlike prior acts before the Court, the GFSZA "is a criminal stat-
ute that by its terms has nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of
economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those
terms."' 6° The Court also distinguished the activity at issue in Lopez,
gun possession, from the activity at issue in Wickard v. Filburn,6'
wheat production for personal use, by asserting that the latter in-
volved a commercial activity whose intrastate effects could be aggre-
"' 18 U.S.C. § 992(q)(2)(A) (1994).
114 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
"' Id. at 568.
156 Id. at 558-59.
... Id. at 559.
158 id.
"59/d. at 5 51.
6o Id. at 561.
61 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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gated.'62 The Court asserted that if it aggregated the non-economic
activity of gun possession, as the Government urged it to do, it would
be "hard pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress
is without power to regulate."' 63
Federalism is a persistent theme throughout the majority opinion
of Lopez.'64 Chief Justice Rehnquist began his Commerce Clause
analysis by describing the way in which the Constitution divides the
framework of the United States' government between the national
government and the states, describing this framework as the "first
principles."' 65 In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy asserted
that it is the judiciary's role to maintain the balance between federal
and state power,'66 and he argued that the GFSZA upsets the balance
of power to such a degree that the judiciary must step in to render it
unconstitutional.'67 Moreover, the Chief Justice argued that to sustain
the GFSZA would be to undermine any "distinction between what is
truly national and what is truly local."' 68
(2) United States v. Morrison: Confirms that Lopez is the Standard for
Commerce Clause Inquiries
The most recent Supreme Court decision on the constitutionality
of a federal statute under Lopez is the highly anticipated Morrison
decision, in which the Court again found that Congress had exceeded
its constitutional authority under the Commerce Clause.'69 The Court
struck down section 13981 of the Violence Against Women Act of
1994 ("VAWA"), which provided a federal civil remedy for victims
of gender-motivated violent crimes, 7 ° as an unconstitutional exercise
of Congress's commerce power.'7' The opinion in Morrison, again
written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, staunchly reaffirmed the test
handed down in Lopez, establishing that Lopez was not an aberration,
but is the standard by which the Court will view acts of Congress en-
162 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560-61.
163 Id. at 564.
164 See infra notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
165 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552.
166 Id. at 575-76 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
167 Id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
168 Id. at 567-68.
169 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 602 (2000).
"' 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (1994).
171 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627.
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acted under the Commerce Clause.7 2
VAWA ensured the right of all persons in the United States to
"be free from crimes of violence motivated by gender."' 73 The con-
stitutionality of VAWA's civil remedy provision was called into
question when a female Virginia Tech student brought a federal civil
suit under section 13981, alleging that two Virginia Tech football
players raped her 74 The two defendants filed a successful motion to
dismiss, in which they argued that Congress lacked the constitutional
authority to pass section 13981 under the Commerce Clause and the
Fourteenth Amendment.' The United States then intervened on be-
half of the plaintiff and appealed to the Fourth Circuit, arguing that
Congress was justified in passing section 13981 under its commerce
power because gender-motivated violence substantially affected the
national economy.'76 Relying entirely on the principles in Lopez, the
Fourth Circuit held that Lopez dictated that it strike down section
13981 of VAWA as an unconstitutional exercise of Congress's com-
merce power.'77
The Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit's decision, quot-
ing extensively from and delineating the principles set forth in Lo-
pez. i17 The Court evaluated VAWA by applying the factors it had
laid out in evaluating the GFSZA in Lopez. 7 9 First, the Court began
its Commerce Clause analysis by addressing the dispositive issue as
to whether the activity VAWA sought to regulate was economic in
nature. 8 ° Just as in Lopez, the Court concluded that "[g]ender-
motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, eco-
nomic activity. '  Second, the Court held that an aggregation test
could not be applied to prove substantial effect on interstate com-
merce because, according to Lopez, aggregation analysis is only ap-
propriate when the activity in question is economic per se.' 2
172 See Newbern, supra note 150, at 1608-12 (2000).
17' 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b).
174 Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 827 (4th Cir. 1999).
' Id. at 828.
176 id.
177 Id. at 826, 830.
178 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607-12 (2000).
179 Id. at 602, 607-10 (stating that Lopez controlled the Court's decision in this case, and
repeatedly quoting and referring to Lopez).
sId. at 609-10.




The Court also held that the legislative findings used in drafting
VAWA were insufficient to demonstrate a sufficient link between
gender-motivated violence and interstate commerce. 183  Notably,
unlike the GFSZA at issue in Lopez, the VAWA was passed with an
extensive congressional record that detailed the vast effects violence
against women had on various aspects of American society.8 4 Fur-
thermore, VAWA was passed with the overwhelming support from
the vast majority of states.185 The Court dismissed these congressional
findings, however, holding that "the existence of congressional find-
ings is not sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitutionality of
Commerce Clause regulation."' 86
3. Justice Thomas's View of Federalism as Expressed in Lopez and
Morrison Further Warrants Inquiry as to Why Analysis of the
Constitutionality of the CSA is Absent in Oakland
Justice Thomas's views on federalism, as expressed in his con-
curring opinions in both Lopez and Morrison, beg the question as to
why he entirely ignored federalism, the Commerce Clause, and the
constitutionality of the CSA in his decision in Oakland. In Lopez,
Justice Thomas called for an even more narrow interpretation of the
Commerce Clause than Rehnquist's interpretation in the Lopez deci-
sion. '87 He unequivocally asserted that the "Federal Government has
nothing approaching a police power."' 88 Thus, Thomas vigorously
expressed his disapproval of what he characterized as the broad and
unjustified expansion of commerce power.'89 Thomas criticized the
majority's substantial effects test and Wickard's aggregation test as
being inconsistent with the framer's narrower understanding of what
constituted commerce. 9 ' Thomas repeated this criticism in his con-
currence in Morrison, asserting that until the Supreme Court nar-
rowed its standard of what constitutes commerce under the Coin-
183 Id. at 615.
184 See id. at 630-34 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter recounts facts from the con-
gressional record.
115 See Linda Greenhouse, Battle on Federalism, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2000, at A]S.
When Morrison reached the Supreme Court for review, 36 states had joined in amicus briefs
in support of sustaining VAWA. Only one state, Alabama, filed an amicus brief suggesting
that VAWA be struck down.
186 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614.
187 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584-86 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
188 Id. at 584-85 (Thomas, J., concurring).
89 Id. at 599-600 (Thomas, J., concurring).
190 Id. at 585 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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merce Clause, "we will continue to see Congress appropriating state
police powers under the guise of regulating commerce." '191
B. AN APPLICATION OF LOPEZ AND MORRISON TO THE CSA WOULD
HAVE CHANGED THE OUTCOME OF OAKLAND
The Court established in Lopez that the Supreme Court would
evaluate Congressional acts enacted under the Commerce Clause
with an independent, heightened scrutiny in the name of the "first
principles" of federalism.192 Had the Supreme Court applied the
principles it so vigorously asserted in Lopez and Morrison to Oak-
land, especially Justice Thomas's version of these issues, the Court
would have found, at the very least, that the CSA is extremely consti-
tutionally suspect as it is applied to marijuana grown and distributed
wholly within one state, under that state's laws, for medical purposes.
1. Post-Lopez Decisions of Lower Federal Courts Regarding the
Constitutionality of the CSA Are Inconsistent with Lopez and Morrison
The Lopez decision prompted several challenges to the constitu-
tionality of the CSA from defendants convicted of various drug of-
fenses.'93 Notwithstanding Lopez, lower federal courts have uni-
formly upheld the federal drug laws in the face of challenges to other
federal statutes.'94 The federal courts of appeals also have not inter-
preted Lopez as permitting an overhaul of federal drug laws.'95 Such
191 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627 (Thomas, J., concurring).
192 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552, 562-63.
193 See Erik R. Neusch, Comment, Medical Marijuana's Fate in the Aftermath of the Su-
preme Court's New Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 201, 236-44
(2001).
114 See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 893 F. Supp. 935, 937 (S.D. Cal. 1995); United
States v. Bramble, 894 F. Supp. 1384, 1394-96 (D. Haw. 1995), aff'd, 103 F.3d 1475 (9th
Cir. 1996). However, district courts have been more active in upholding Lopez with regard
to other statutes, particularly with newer statutes. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Hunt, 923 F. Supp.
791, 819 (W.D.N.C. 1996) (striking down the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act),
rev'd, 126 F.3d 575 (4th Cir. 1997); United States v. Parker, 911 F. Supp. 830, 835 (E.D. Pa.
1995) (holding that the federal Child Support Recovery Act was unconstitutional), rev'd, 108
F.3d 28 (3d Cir. 1997).
'95 See, e.g., United States v. Westbrook, 125 F.3d 996, 1009 (7th Cir. 1997) ("We join
the other circuits that uniformly have held, after Lopez, that it was within the authority of the
Congress under the Commerce Clause to create drug laws criminalizing narcotics transac-
tions such as those found under 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841."). See also Gilbert v. United
States, 165 F.3d 470, 474 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v. Walker, 142 F.3d 103, 111 (2d
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 896 (1998); Tisor v. United States, 96 F.3d 370, 375 (9th
Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1140 (1997); Proyect v. United States, 101 F.3d 11, 14 (2d
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an interpretation seems to be at odds with the Rehnquist Court's rein-
vigorated federalism ideals. Oakland, one of the only cases involving
the CSA to reach the Supreme Court, served as an opportunity to ap-
ply Lopez to the CSA, to reassert the federalism concerns it stressed
in Lopez, and to decide its constitutionality one way or the other.
The lower federal courts have upheld the CSA by distinguishing
it from the GFSZA on three general grounds.'96 First, lower courts
have argued that unlike the GFSZA, the CSA contains specific and
extensive findings as to the substantial effect single state drug activi-
ties have on interstate commerce. 97 Second, federal courts, including
the district court in United States v. Cannabis Cultivators Club, have
concluded that in contrast to gun possession, intrastate drug posses-
sion is inherently commercial.'98 Third, courts have held that under
the Wickard doctrine, Congress may regulate trivial instances of drug
activity, such as possession or cultivation, because they fall within a
broader "class of activities" that Congress believed to affect interstate
commerce. 1
99
Taken one by one, an analysis of each of the arguments set forth
by lower federal courts to uphold the CSA reveals that the Act may
very well exceed Congress's enumerated powers under the Com-
merce Clause.
2. The Lopez and Morrison Decisions Established that Legislative Findings
Do Not Necessarily Prove A Substantial Effect on Interstate Commerce
Congress claims that it can regulate the intrastate cultivation and
possession of marijuana for medical purposes because they fall into
Cir. 1996), United States v. Kim, 94 F.3d 1247, 1249-50 (9th Cir. 1996), United States v.
Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475, 1479 (9th Cir. 1996), United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 1112
(4th Cir. 1995).
196 See infra text accompanying notes 197-199.
197 See, e.g., United States v. McKinney, 98 F.3d 974, 979 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 1119 (1997); United States v. Genao, 79 F.3d 1333, 1337 (2d Cir. 1996); Proyect,
101 F.3d at 12; Leshuk, 65 F.3d at 1112.
198 See, e.g., United States v. Cannabis Cultivators' Club, 5 F.Supp. 2d 1086, 1098 (N.D.
Cal. 1998); Proyect, 101 F.3d at 13 ("The Controlled Substances Act concerns an obviously
economic activity.") (quoting Genao, 79 F.3d at 1337).
199 See, e.g., Tisor, 96 F.3d at 375 ("The challenged laws are part of a wider regulatory
scheme criminalizing interstate and intrastate commerce in drugs."); Leshuk, 65 F.3d at 1112
("In passing the Drug Act, Congress made detailed findings that intrastate manufacture, dis-
tribution and possession of controlled substances, as a class of activities, 'have a substantial
and direct effect' upon interstate drug trafficking .... ") (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 801).
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the third category of activities defined by Lopez, regulation of "those
activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce.,
20 0
Thus, a significant portion of the Congressional findings that preface
the CSA are a justification of the Act's regulation of wholly intrastate
activity.2"' These findings stress (1) that such intrastate activity has a
substantial effect on interstate activity and (2) the practical difficulty
in distinguishing between controlled substances based on the place
they were manufactured and the scope of their distribution.2 2 Con-
gress also stresses that federal control of the intrastate incidents of the
traffic in controlled substances is essential to the effective control of
the interstate incidences of such traffic.20 3
However, the Court made clear in Lopez, and then reaffirmed in
Morrison, that legislative findings that a wholly intrastate conduct
substantially affects interstate commerce do not end the Court's in-
quiry.2" Furthermore, the Supreme Court has clearly established that
whether particular activities substantially affect interstate commerce
is "ultimately a judicial rather than a legislative question" to be "set-
tled finally only by [the Supreme] Court.""2 ° Thus, simply because
Congress asserts in its legislative findings of the CSA that wholly in-
trastate drug activities affect interstate commerce no longer means
that the Court will accept that assertion. The Court in Lopez asserted
that "simply because Congress may conclude that a particular activity
substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily make it
so. 210 6  Morrison not only affirms Lopez in this regard, but also
heightens the bar for Congress. The Morrison Court admits that,
unlike the law at issue in Lopez, VAWA was supported by countless
200 Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
201 21 U.S.C. § 801 (1994).
202 21 U.S.C. § 801 ("A major portion of the traffic in controlled substances flows
through interstate and foreign commerce. Incidents of the traffic which are not an integral
part of the interstate or foreign flow, such as manufacture, local distribution, and possession,
nonetheless have a substantial and direct effect upon interstate commerce ....").
20' 21 U.S.C § 801 ("Federal control of the intrastate incidents of the traffic in controlled
substances is essential to the effective control of the interstate incidents of such traffic.").
204 See infra text acompanying notes 209-16.
205 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 273 (Black, J., concur-
ring). Both Lopez and Morrison quote this passage. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598, 614 (2000); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 n.2. See also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-63 (discussing
the Court's "independent evaluation" of Congress's legislative findings, intended to "evalu-
ate the legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially affected interstate com-
merce.").
206 514 U.S. at 557 n.2 (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc.,
452 U.S. 264,311 (1981)).
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findings regarding the serious impact that gender-motivated violence
has on victims and their families." 7 However, the Court stated, "the
existence of congressional findings is not sufficient, by itself, to sus-
tain the constitutionality of Commerce Clause legislation."2 °8
3. A Heightened Scrutiny of the CSA's Legislative Findings Reveals
Medical Marijuana Conduct Does Not Have a Substantial Effect on
Interstate Commerce
The Supreme Court has made it clear in both Lopez and Morri-
son that it will subject Congress's findings in support of legislation
passed under the Commerce Clause to a strict, independent review.
Strict scrutiny of the legislative findings of the CSA reveals several
problems with the justifications Congress presented in support of its
enactment of the CSA.
First, in both Lopez and Morrison, the Court relied on what has
been termed as the "non-infinity principle" to emphasize the narrow
range of what Congress may regulate under the Commerce Clause."'
The "non-infinity principle" dictates that "for a Commerce Clause
rationale to be acceptable under Lopez, it must not be a rationale that
would allow Congress to legislate on everything."2 ' In rejecting the
GFSZA, the Court expressed its fears that Congress's "costs of
crime" and "national productivity" justifications for the GSFZA
would allow Congress to regulate virtually any activity under the
Commerce Clause.2 1 The Court stated that under these theories pre-
sented by the Government in support of the GFSZA, "it is difficult to
perceive any limitation on federal power, even in areas such as crimi-
nal law enforcement or education where states have historically been
sovereign. '
The Court again relied on the "non-infinity principle" in Morri-
son to reject Congress's justifications in support for VAWA. The
Court essentially implied that Congress's findings were less persua-
sive because they, in effect, proved too much." 3 The Court explained
207 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614.
208 Id.
209 See David B. Kopel & Glenn H. Reynolds, Taking Federalism Seriously: Lopez and
the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, 30 CONN. L. REV. 59, 69 (1997). This article first coined
the phrase "non-infinity principle."
210 Id. at 69.
211 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564.
212 id.
213 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615 (2000).
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that under the method of reasoning used by Congress to support
VAWA, Congress could regulate "murder or any other type of vio-
lence since gender-motivated violence, as a subset of all violent
crime, is certain to have lesser economic impacts than the larger class
of which it is a part. ' 214 The Court concluded that to allow Congress
to regulate such a broad category of crimes would be an intolerable
invasion upon the traditional domain of state criminal law enforce-
ment.215
Thus, the Court has established that that it will not accept justifi-
cations for Congressional authority under the Commerce Clause that
are so broad that they essentially allow Congress to regulate any ac-
tivity imaginable, so long as it somehow touches upon interstate
commerce. 216 Implicit in this Lopez finding is the fact that Congress
must indicate through its legislative findings that an Act passed under
the Commerce Clause does not reach every single activity within a
class of activities." 7 Thus, the non-infinity principle of Lopez and
Morrison dictates that Congress cannot regulate every conceivable
aspect of controlled substances use as federal crimes.218 One aspect
that should be out of Congress's control under the CSA is the wholly
intrastate conduct of local possession and cultivation of marijuana,
which is legal under a state's own laws pursuant to its own citizens'
219actions.
This assertion is supported and bolstered by many facts. First,
Congress's findings in support of the CSA are devoted to a congres-
sional concern with the interstate market in illicit drugs.220 However,
medical marijuana does not necessarily implicate an interstate mar-
ket, as it can be cultivated, distributed, and consumed locally without
ever crossing a state line.221 State-governed and regulated coopera-
tives can ensure that such conduct remains intrastate, helping to
lower abuse of the medical marijuana law by confining distribution
214 id.
215 Id. at 618.
216 Id. at 615; see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564.
217 Newbern, supra note 150, at 1624.
218 Id. at 1624-25.
219 Id. at 1625.
220 21 U.S.C. § 801 ("A major portion of the traffic in controlled substances flows
through interstate and foreign commerce. Incidents of the traffic which are not an integral
part of the interstate or foreign flow, such as manufacture, local distribution, and possession,
nonetheless have a substantial and direct effect upon interstate commerce... .
221 Neusch, supra note 199, at 248.
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locally to qualified patients."2 Furthermore, Proposition 215, as well
as every other recently passed state medical marijuana initiative, ex-
plicitly limits the amount of marijuana qualified patients can procure
or possess for their treatment, which lessens the probability of inter-
state contact. 223 Lastly, in Conant, the most significant case involv-
ing Proposition 215 prior to Oakland, Judge Smith stated that the
number of medical marijuana users who obtain the drug through con-
duct protected by Proposition 215 is too small to have a significant
impact upon the national drug trade. 4
Second, the CSA, like the GSFZA, does not have a jurisdictional
element to ensure through a case-by-case inquiry that conduct re-
lated to controlled substances had any tie to interstate commerce.225
Thus, in order to successfully prosecute under the CSA, the govern-
ment must show an additional, requisite nexus between an individual
defendant's marijuana use (or activities related to that use) and inter-
state commerce. 226 Because the marijuana at issue in Oakland was
cultivated and used locally, to show a nexus to interstate commerce
would require the Government to "pile inference upon inference,"
which the Lopez decision expressly and unequivocally rejected. 27
4. Wickard Aggregation Principle Is Not Applicable to Medical Marijuana
Conduct Because Medical Marijuana is Not Inherently Commercial
In Wickard v. Filburn, the Supreme Court held that Congress has
the power to legislate with regard to activity that, in the aggregate,
has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 28 The Wickard Court
upheld the application of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 to
the production of homegrown wheat on the basis that, when aggre-
gated, such conduct has an effect on the supply and demand of inter-
222 Id.
223 See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. 18, § 14; ALASKA STAT. § 17.37.040 (2000); OR. REV.
STAT. § 37.475.306 (2001); WASH. REV. CODE § 69.69.51A.040 (2002).
224 Conant 1, 172 F.R.D. 681, 694 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
225 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561-62 (1995). See also United States v.
Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971). In Bass, the Court held that 18 U.S.C.§1201(a), which
made it a federal crime for a convicted felon to possess a firearm, required additional proof
on the part of the government of a connection to interstate commerce due to the ambiguous
nature of the statute. The Court set aside the conviction because, although the government
had demonstrated that the defendant possessed a firearm, it failed to show the "requisite
nexus with interstate commerce."
226 514 U.S. at 561-62 (discussing Bass).
227 Id. at 567.
228 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124-29 (1942).
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state commerce.229
However, in both Lopez and Morrison, the Court established that
the Wickard aggregation principle will not be applied to intrastate ac-
tivities that are not economic, even if they may be closely linked to
economic activities.230 Thus, in order to determine whether the
Wickard aggregation principle applies to conduct related to medical
use of marijuana, one must first determine whether such conduct is an
economic or commercial activity.2 3' While the sale of marijuana con-
stitutes commercial conduct, supplying marijuana without charge to
another for medical purposes is much more questionable. Cultivation
and possession of marijuana for personal medical use is even more
questionable. However, the CSA regulates all of the above.232
Furthermore, the facts of Wickard and Oakland can be distin-
guished convincingly. In Wickard, the homegrown wheat consump-
tion at issue detracted from a national market that the government
was trying to maintain and bolster as part of the New Deal legisla-
233 Wction. The Wickard Court feared that production and consumption
of homegrown wheat would either create a surplus in the interstate
market or reduce demand if many farmers partook in the activity.
234
By contrast, the effect of regulated, local cultivation and consumption
of medical marijuana would, if anything, have the opposite effect be-
cause it would reduce the demand for commercially available mari-
juana in the illegal drug market.235 Thus, it is possible that the effect
would be to diminish the very market the federal government is try-
ing to eliminate with the CSA.236 Therefore, it would be inappropri-
ate for Congress to aggregate the effects of conduct relating to medi-
cal marijuana to prove a substantial effect on interstate commerce
because 1) it is questionable as to whether such conduct is economic
in nature, and 2) such conduct can easily be distinguished from the
229 Id. at 127-29.
230 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-60 (noting that, in every case in which the Court has sus-
tained a federal regulation under Wickard's aggregation principle, the regulated activity was
economic in nature); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611(2000).
231 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-560.
231 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), § 844(a).
233 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 115-16 (discussing the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938
and its purposes and effects).
234 Id. at 127.
235 See Neusch, supra note 193, at 251.
236 See 21 U.S.C. § 801 (1994 & Supp. V. 1998). See also United States v. Greenberg,
334 F.Supp 364, 366 (W.D. Pa. 1971) (stating that the purpose of 21 U.S.C. § 801 is to pro-
vide a system for control of drug traffic and to prevent abuse of drugs).
2002]
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
conduct at issue in Wickard."7
VI. CONCLUSION:
An examination of the constitutionality of the CSA as applied to
medical marijuana was necessary to adequately decide Oakland. Not
only do the fundamental principles of federalism require such an in-
quiry, but a constitutional inquiry was necessary to remain consistent
with the Rehnquist Court's recent efforts to reestablish federalism
and to rein in Congress's abuse of its commerce power. Had the
Court engaged in a constitutional examination, it would have found
that, according to Lopez and Morrison, the CSA's regulation of
medical marijuana arguably lies beyond Congress's commerce
power. The cultivation, possession, and use of marijuana for medical
purposes wholly within the borders of California or any other state
have a negligible effect on interstate commerce. A determination that
the federal government cannot regulate such intrastate activity related
to medical use of marijuana, when California's state laws sanction
and regulate it, would not compromise existing federal drug laws, but
would merely require that Congress act within its constitutional au-
thority. To sustain Congress's power over such activity, in light of
Morrison and Lopez, would be to apply a selective Commerce Clause
and states' rights jurisprudence.
Caroline Herman
237 21 U.S.C. § 801.
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